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Executive Summary
The automotive industry in Korea, Brazil, China and India is currently going through
impressive growth. Governments have played a key role in the evolution of the industry in all
these countries. The Korean industry has made the most significant progress, and is now
exporting cars to developed markets. It is the only country that invested in R&D for product
development, retained management control in joint ventures with multinational companies
(MNCs), and had ambitious export targets. The industry in Brazil is controlled entirely by
MNCs. Although this has led to growth and adoption of lean production, indigenous product
development is lacking. Tariff barriers have come down, forcing domestic production to
become more market responsive. Fluctuating tariffs and taxes, and cyclical demand have
characterized the industry. Indian industry is experiencing a revolution with rapid growth and
the entry of 9 MNCs and plans for 3 more to enter in the next two years. The Chinese industry
is also growing very rapidly although it is still highly fragmented. Passenger cars are only
15% of total vehicle production in China. Demand in Brazil, India and China is highly price
sensitive and growth is led by the demand for a small car. Higher taxes on mid and large size
cars give the small c r a big price advantage. Import duties for components imply that the
supplier base in these countries needs to develop fast. The supplier industry could become a
bottleneck for growth.
A major implication is that the future in China and India, the two biggest potential markets
with the highest growth rates, is uncertain though bright. Governments seem to appreciate the
necessity for stable policies and progressive deregulation, and regard the automotive industry
as one of the pillars for ec nomic growth. However, uncertainty exists about the extent of
growth, the degree to which suppliers can meet demand, and the number of players that will
be able to survive in the long run. MNCs have followed the practice of introducing successful
models to these markets. It remains to be seen whether this strategy will succeed. The
Brazilian industry is much older than that of C ina or India, and will probably continue to
experience significant growth. Capacity is expected to reach 2.5 to 3 million by the year 2000.
The Korean car makers are also entering India, and could enter other emerging markets as
well. Korea is a market for overseas MNCs, but is emerging as a trade partner rather than a
major net importer of cars. However, opportunities exist for overseas supplier companies in
Korea. With stagnation in developed markets and huge additions of capacity in emerging
markets, monopoly of MNCs over car production could erode although they will continue to
dominate product development.
Introduction
Korea, Brazil, China and India on the one hand, and Thailand, Mexico, Malaysia, and
Indonesia on the other hand are all late-industrializing nations. But, as Amsden and Kang
(1995) argue, there is a basic difference between the two groups with regard to the current nd
future status of their automobile industries. The second group of late ind strializing countries,
comprising Thailand, Mexico, Malaysia and Indonesia have built an indigenous automobile
industry to restrict ou flow of precious foreign exchange and to meet local demand. These
countries do not intend to bec me major players in the global automobile industry in the near
future. On the other hand, the first group of late-industrializing countries, namely Korea,
Brazil, China and India are building significant manufacturing capabilities and have the
potential to become significant players in the world automobile industry. Korea has already
become a significant exporter. The sheer size and market potential of China and India, and
impressive rates of economic growth suggest that they could emerge as significant players in
world markets. Amsden and Kang (1995) call this group of countries `emerging economies or
manufacturers' and not just `emerging markets.'
The evolution and current state of the automobile industry in these emerging economies are not
identical. The objective of this paper is to do a comparative analysis of the automobile
industries in these four countries and identify some factors that seem to lead to better
performance.
There are some major differences between these countries and the d veloped nations. First,
industry evolution has been influenced considerably by Government policies and regulat ons
in all these countries. However, this may not necessarily impede growth and development
since these governments sometimes play a supportive role that helps build long term
capabilities. Second, infrastructure in roads tends to be poor. This has implications for the
long term growth of the industry. The level of technology and manufacturing capability tends
to be highly varying with very few world class plants and many others at a fairly mediocre
level. The supplier industry is also not well developed, and product development capabilities
tend to be poor except perhaps in the case of Korea. These markets are also much more price
sensititive than developed markets. This is perhaps because the ratio of car prices to incomes
is much higher in emerging markets. On the positive side, assembly costs in these countries
are lower by at least 30% (O'Brien and Karmokalias 1994), although this does not give any
significant advantage since assembly costs are a small proportion of total costs.
Economic Performance
The economic performance in 1994 of the automobile industries of Korea, Brazil, China and
India, based on a few important dimensions, is given in the following able. The data includes
sales of all vehicles other than passenger cars also.
DIMENSIONS   KOREA   BRAZIL   CHINA   INDIA
1. Share of world vehicle sales
volume (%) (1994)
2. Growth in share of world
vehicle sales volume   (1991-1995)
3. Production (million units)
4. New registrations (million units)
5. Share of output exported (%)
6. Share of inputs imported (%)
7. Share (%) of passenger car in
total vehicle sales
8. Persons per car
   2.5
   8.7
   1.5
   1.05
    25
    <1
    68
   12.4
   2.2
   12.4
   0.96
   0.77
    20
     0
    75
   11.4
   2.0
  42.86
   0.51
   0.62
     0
    6.0
    15
   245
   1.0
  42.86
   0.34
   0.34
   5.0
  <1.0
    60
   200
These four countries together accounted for about 7.7% of world sales in 1994. As i  clear
from the table, India and China offer huge untapped markets and their growth rates are als
impressive. However, the volume f trade with the rest of the world is very low. Korea and
Brazil on the other hand have significant exports, but few imports. There are likely to be
opportunities for foreign companies since these emerging markets cannot develop without help
from outside. In China, the share of passenger cars in total vehicle sales is very low at 15%.
Industry Evolution
The evolution of the automobile industry in these countries has some interesting differences.
Amsden and Kang (1995) trace significant developments in the Korean industry. The Korean
automobile industry started production in the early 1960s and initially gained experience
through CKD manufacture, and started mass production with a si gle model (the Pony).
Three large diversified Korean companies emerged in the automobile market - Daewoo,
Hyundai and Kia. These companies gained knowledge and experience through joint ventures
with MNCs, although they never surrendered management control. Later they developed their
own models for the world market. Government policies clearly encouraged exports, and by
1993 they were exporting 38% of their production. In s ry evolution has been driven by the
need to grow and export by passing throu h the stages of CKD manufacture, foreign
collaboration with Korean managerial control, mass production and export of a limited number
of models, gradual adoption of lean production and finally, acquiring product design
capabilities to try and become truly international.
The Indian automobile industry was governed by egulations since the country became
independent in 1947. Imports, collaborations and equity ventures were severely restricted by
the government. Capacity expansion was restricted and required licenses issued by the
government, and technology transfer from foreign companies was subject to government
approval. In 1981, the government decided to set up Maruti Udyog Limited in c llaboration
with Suzuki Motor Company of Japan, the first MNC to enter the country. Maruti started
mass production by introducing a "people's" car in the e onomy segment. This led to a boom
in demand for automobiles in India. With a current capacity of about 250,000 vehicles, Maruti
is the clear market leader with about 70% market share in 1995.
Market liberalization in 1991 and a change in policy allowed free entry to foreign companies.
MNCs have not chosen to enter on heir own and have entered into joint venures with Indian
partners. Unlike the Korean industry which grew from CKD manufacture to a significant
exporter of cars, the Indian automobile industry's growth seems to be currently led by
immediately available opportunities in the domestic market. Several large assemblers have
entered the Indian market through joint ventures. Unlike Korea, managerial control is with
international companies. As of date, no Indian company has plans to become a significant
global player except perhaps Telco which is about to launch indigenously designed vehicles in
international markets. The component industry however, has a long way to go to meet the
challenge. Therefore, the assemblers are initially importing knocked-down kits, and are
slowly indigenizing. Several assemblers are ncouraging their own overseas component
suppliers to enter India through joint ventures with local supplier firms. One can characterize
the industry evolution as a movement from strict government regulations to an industry driven
by growth prospects, foreign managerial control, minimal government interference except for
duties and taxes, and no major thrust towards becoming truly global or acquiring capabilities
in product development. However it may emerge as a significant exporter since domestic
markets may not be able to sustain 18 companies in the country.
The development of the Brazilian automotive industry has been described by Ferro (1995).
The industry initially started off with the objective of import substitution in the 1950s.
However, unlike Indian government policy at that time, foreign companies were allowed to
enter with full management control, and Volkswagen, General Motors and Ford were major
companies in Brazil for a long time. However, isolation from world trade hampered industry
development. Much later, in 1990, the government opened up the market to imports. Current
growth has been led by the "popular" car in the economy segment. The Brazilian industry has
also not invested significantly in product development. Efforts are on to adopt lean
manufacturing practices, although the supplier industry continues to a major bottleneck.
Government policy on duties and taxes has been vacillating leading to cyc ic l demand over
the years. The evolution of the Brazilian industry has been a transition from import
substitution to integration with world markets, fluctuating duties and taxes, government led
price reductions, thrust towards adoption of lean production and growth led by the "popular"
or small car segment. No indigenous Brazilian automotive company has emerged so far and
there is no thrust towards acquiring product development capabilities.
The evolution of the industry in China has been described in detail by Yang (1994). The
Chinese automobile industry had a different evolution. The industry has always been high y
fragmented and in 1979 there were 130 assemblers who made 186,000 vehicles, with most of
them making only hundreds of vehicles. By 1993 there was some consolidation into
'combined management companies' and there were 40 assemblers producing about 500,000
vehicles. Further, unlike Korea, Brazil and India, passenger car production has been a very
small percentage of total production, and was 15% in 1994. Autonomy provided to provincial
governments led to dispersed dev lopment led by foreign collaborations. The strategy was to
obtain foreign capital and technology, and they were forced to give managerial control to
international partners. Of late the government has been trying to push a "people's car" in the
economy segment. This is similar to what happened in Brazil and India where the small car led
industry growth. The industry is in the process of developing its supplier base, and probably
has some way to go before it acquires product development skills. It is also probable that
unlike Brazil and Korea, there will be no major thrust toward adopting lean production in the
near future.
Industry evolution has therefore been led by government policy, notably the degree of
autonomy given to provincial governments, attempts to consolidate a highly fragmented
industry, acquisition of foreign capital and technology, relatively weak Chinese managerial
control in joint ventures, and a thrust towards gr th and development. Impressive economic
growth and a large population with a very low number of cars per th us nd people suggest
that demand is likely to grow significantly.
Government Policies
The Indian government has made significant shifts in its au omobile policy. Ever since
independence, the government considered the passenger car as a luxury item, and imposed
very high tariffs. After the economic liberalization launched in 1991, the Government of India
announced a new automobile policy in June 1993. Excise duties varied over the years as
follows.
1984-85 1990-91 1992-93 1992-93 1993-94
15% 42% 66% 56% 40%
The import duty on car components was increased from 40% to 75% during 1984-91 and
brought down to 50% recently. Thus duties and taxes continue to be high by international
standards. These might be brought down as the industry becomes more competitive.
The Brazilian government's role has also made changes in the recent past. Previously, the
focus of government poilicy was on import substitution, as is typical of most developing
countries. The government is now trying to improve the global competitiveness of the
Brazilian automobile industry by opening it up to imports. On the other hand, the government
is also introducing supportive measures to rejuvenate the domestic industry. Some of these
measures are : new institutional arrangements involving the entire supply chain including the
importers, unions and government agencies, tax reductions, and pushi g the `popular' or
small car by differential taxes. Import duties have varied a lot in the last five years as shown
below.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Feb 1995 April 1995
85% 60% 50% 40% 35% 20% 70%
Some stability in policy is probably needed for faster development of the industry.
The influence of the Chinese gov rnment in shaping the country's automobile industry has
been significant. China's progress from the command to the market economy, and the
autonomy given to provincial governments has helped growth. The government also
succeeded to some extent in consolidating a highly fragmented industry. The Chine e
government now identifies the auto industry as one of China's `developmental pillars' and has
been trying to attract foreign investment to improve technology. It has even accepted its role as
a minority partner in some ventures. The government is also encouraging the "people's" car.
Although managerial control is with foreign companies, they ar  obliged to raise the domestic
content of car subassemblies. The government has also played an active role in restructuring
manufacturer-supplier relations.
The role of the Korean government has perhaps been the most positive among all the four
countries. This is because the Korean government has always supported as well as disciplined
the Korean industry through export targets and incentives and through price controls.
Overseas investments were encouraged by subsidised credit, and technology infrastructure
improved through imports. The industry also enjoys trade protection. It is interesting to note
that price controls seem to have had a positive impact in Korea, forcing companies to improve
productivity and efficiency by cutting osts. However, in Brazil, these controls were perhaps
counterproductive. This may be due to high rates of inflation, leading to severe pressures on
profit margins and adversely affecting assembler-supplier relations. It is also likely to have
had an adverse impact on growth. Another factor might have been that unlike Korea, there
was no drive to acquire, absorb and develop technology and products, which in turn was
driven by the need to export. Price controls thus worked well in an industry with higher levels
of capability, whereas they were counterproductive in an industry at an earlier stage of
evolution.
State participation in assembly units is high in China. The joint ventures with Peugeot, VW,
Chrysler, and GM have state participation in equity. India's largest as embler Maruti, is a 50-
50 venture between the Government and Suzuki. However government participation is absent
in all other companies. State participation in equity is completely absent in Korea and Brazil.
The following table summarizes some of the key elements of government policy.
  KOREA   BRAZIL   CHINA   INDIA
Local content
requirements
Not an issue  High  High  None*
Import duty
Full vehicles:
CKD/SKD:
Parts/components:
    25%
    15%
    70%
    30%
    20%
   30%
   25%
   110%
    50%
    50%
Excise duty   10-25%    20-35%   High     40%
State Ownership  Absent  Absent  High    Low
* Capacity expansions require government licences and may depend on the level of
indigenization.
Industry Structure
The car assembly industry of the four countries have been compared in the following table,
based on the number of firms, level of concentration, and the major MNCs present in the
country.
COUNTRY NUMBER OF
ASSEMBLERS
GROWTH IN
NO. OF
ASSEMBLERS
(%) (1985-95)
OUTPUT
SHARE OF
TOP 3 FIRMS
(%)
GROWTH IN
OUTPUT
SHARE OF
TOP 3
FIRMS
(%)(1985-95)
MNCs PRESENT
KOREA    6    100    95    -5 Mazda, Mitsubishi,
GM, Ford, Honda,
Mercedes
BRAZIL    5     28    95   15.8 GM, Ford
VW, Fiat,
CHINA   18    38.5    48    4.3 GM, VW,
Chrysler, Peugeot
INDIA    5    100    88   17.33 Suzuki, Peugeot,
GM
Ford, Fiat,
Daewoo,
Mercedes, Rover,
VW*
* Hyundai, Mitsubishi, BMW have announced plans to enter in the years 1996-98. Audi plans
to sell cars without local manufacture.
Supplier Industry
The auto component industry of these countries differ in the number and size distribution of
component firms, and other characteristics, like turnover, OEM/RM split, equity,and export
performance.
  KOREA   BRAZIL    CHINA   INDIA
No. of firms   1100    550   250-300    350
Turnover ($bn)    12     15     5   2.6
OEM:RM Split   80:20   50:50    50:50   20:80
Overseas
collaborations
Many
licensing
agreements
20% of firms
are foreign
affiliates
Many licensing
agreements
60% of firms
have Japanese
links
38% of
firms have
foreign tie
ups
Exports 10% of sales 15-20% of
sales
20% of sales 10% of sales
One of the reasons for the success of the Korean automobile industry is the closely knit
assembler-supplier structure. The automobile assembler companies belong to large chaebols
(conglomerates). Thus, they have affiliate firms within the conglomerate supplying them with
parts, machinery, software or information, and even fi ancing. Suppliers have invested
heavily in learning both from assemblers and from foreign supplier companies, and have
become more capital-intensive and specialized. The result is improved performance, and
ability to design some proprietary parts. This has helped assemblers enter world markets.
Such close assembler-supplier relations within the same business group or conglomerate is not
there in India, Brazil or China. The industry size in India and China is much smaller than in
Korea and Brazil, although growth rates are much higher.
Extent of Adoption of Lean Production
The extent to which these emerging economies have adopted lean production varies. Korean
companies argue that lean production can be successful only when there are large volumes.
Since the Korean companies have relatively low volumes, they have not adopted lean
production. JIT is not practised because of the very low volumes that would be transported,
the poor quality of parts suppliers and the instability of the process due to rapid introduction of
new models, and rapid growth. Other elements of lean manufacturing like developing multi
skilled workers and allowing workers to stop the assembly line are not practis d perhaps
because of the current emphasis on growth and exports. However, they are aware of the
benefits of lean production, and consi er lean production as a goal to be achieved in the near
future.
The experiment with adoption of lean production in Brazil seems to hav  borne fruit (Ferro
1993). Inspite of cultural factors like high power distance and an uthoritarian structure which
inhibit the diffusion of lean production, the Brazilian industry has been able to make use of the
motivated and trained workforce to push acceptance of lean manufacturing approaches, like
teamwork, training, participation, inv lvement and commitment of workforce, increased
communication and decentralization, emphasis on problem solving activities, reduction of
quality inspectors, and flatter structures by cutting managerial and supervisory layers. The
results are reduced inventory and lead time, reduced defects and increased productivity.
Since the Indian industry achieved significant production volumes in the mid 1980s with the
arrival of Maruti, the transition to lean production is likely to take time. However, with many
automobile makers entering the growing Indian market, lean production is likely to be
adopted. The success of lean production at the industry level depends not only on the efforts
of the assemblers, but also on the suppliers and on institutional and cultural factors. A ve y
important obstacle in adopting lean production is tha  a large proportion of components are
imported in the form of CKD/SKD kits by the new entrants. Distances of suppliers from
assemblers are frequently high. The bargaining power of su pliers for some components is
high, because of their small number. They accept only large orders. It is likely that after the
shake out which many analysts expect, adoption of lean production will take off more rapidly.
There is not much information available about the diffusion of lean manufacturing practices in
China. However, given the diffused nature of the industry and the low volumes generated, it
is expected that the Chinese industry has a long way to go, before it can adopt lean
manufacturing as an industry paradigm.
Implications and Conclusions
The table in the Appendix summarizes the comparison between these countries. T  Korea
industry, a later entrant than Brazil, has progressed much further. Government support, a
clear vision of becoming an export oriented world class industry, retaining management
control, investing in R&D, and acquiring product development capabilities has helped it to
grow and develop fast. The other three countries have not invested in capability development
to the same extent. Brazilian plants are simply overseas plants of MNCs. Indian plants are
joint ventures with MNC control. It is unlikely that significant R&D will be done there. In
Brazil, China and India, industry growth is led by the small car seg ent. Lean production has
not been adopted in a significant way, except perhaps in Brazil. The relatively poor
development of the supplier industry is still acting as a deterrent to rapid growth.
Uncertainty exists about the extent of growth, the degree to which suppliers can meet demand,
and the prospects for an individual company. MNCs have followed the practic  of introducing
successful models to these markets. It remains to be seen whether this strategy will succeed.
Korea is a market for overseas MNCs, but is emerging as a trade partner rather than a major
net importer of cars. However, opportunities exist for overseas supplier companies in Korea.
With stagnation in developed markets and huge additions of capacity i  emerging markets, the
monopoly of developed nations over car production could erode, although they will continue
to dominate product development.
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Appendix
Korea Brazil China India
Evolution CKD - mass production of one
model - exports -building skills
in product development
Import substitution -growth
and entry of 4 MNC's -
foreign managerial control
Highly fragmented industry
-consolidation - joint ventures
with MNC control - growth
Government regulations -
growth - entry of 13 MNC's
- foreign managerial control
-deregulation
Major productsMid Size Small Car Small Car Small Car
New Product
development
Capability exists although
suppliers are lagging behind
Indigenous capability lackingI digenous capability low Except Telco, capability
lacking
Managerial
control
With Korean companies With MNC's With MNC's Usually with MNC's
Lean
Production
Gradually adopting it Thrust towards lean
production
Marginal Marginal
Goal of
Technology
Strategy
To become world class and
global. Investing heavily in R&D
To facilitate growth and
efficiency. Low investment
in R&D
To meet domestic needs. A
catch up strategy
To facilitate growth. Low
investment in R&D
Suppliers Moving towards world class
status.
Some are able to design
proprietary parts
Getting restructured for lean
production.
Acquiring design capabilities
Growing rapidly through joint
ventures
Growing rapidly through
joint ventures
Government
role
To help investments abroad, and
to upgrade technology
infrastructure
Disciplining and supporting
industry
Fluctuating tariffs, price
controls, heavy taxes except
for low priced `popular' cars
Acquiring technology and
managerial expertise through
joint ventures
Largely restricted to duties
and excise. No clear policy
as yet.
